The Supreme Court had issues with the language “engaged in other unlawful sexual conduct”
“Mr. Trettis did not think that that the words “otherwise engaged in other unlawful sexual activity” made any sense. He noted that the offense is one of solicitation and not a completed act.”
Questions the use of “otherwise” and the intent of “other unlawful sexual conduct”
“Each of the three chapters specifically listed in the information contains multiple criminal offenses, while the ultra-vague “or to otherwise engage in any unlawful sexual conduct” could be used to convict the defendant of literally any sex offense contained in the Florida Statutes.”
The fact that the Legislature used different terminology confirms a different legislative intent.
“As it stands, the use of the phrase "to engage in" permits a jury to convict a defendant under an invalid theory of prosecution. The standard instruction should be changed to conform to the language of the statute and thereby conform to the intent of the Legislature.”
This categorical approach is more general than the U. S. Supreme Court has authorized
The United States Government asserts the phrase "otherwise engage in other unlawful sexual conduct" should be read as limiting the scope of the chapter 794, 800, and 827 offenses that violate Fla. Stat. § 847.0135(4)(b) to offenses that similarly involve sexual conduct.